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In our book, Federalism: Political Identity and Tragic 
Compromise, my colleague Edward Rubin and I (2008) reacted to 
the parochialism in most political science and legal scholarship on  
federalism. Almost all discussions of federalism are of the sort, 
“American federalism,” “Swiss federalism,” “Australian 
federalism,” and the like, and are tied up with the intricacies of the 
particular histories of a specific country’s practical problems with 
inter-governmental relations. How does money flow from the 
centre to the parts?  How are various policies jointly financed? 
How is over-sight shared?  These are all immensely important 
questions with much of importance resting on the answers.  They 
are deserving of serious and sustained responses.  
However, our concern was with federalism generally, as a basic 
structural arrangement of governance.  It was with the theory of 
federalism.  We noted a paucity of theoretical concern with the 
concept of federalism in contrast to say theoretical concerns of 
other structures of government.  There are, for instance, robust 
theories of presidential versus parliamentary systems,   theories of 
representation, theories of the separation of powers, theories of 
democracy.  But there is no comparative body of theoretical work 
on federalism.   Our effort was to help launch such an inquiry.   It is 
long overdue since according to some  authorities  up to eighty 
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precent of the world’s population lives in some sort of 
governmental system that can be described as “federal.” (Elazar 
1994), this effort seems long overdue.   
Of course I overstate the matter. There is a long tradition of 
theorizing about federalism.  Federalism theory is linked to 
discussions present since the middle ages about subsidiarity, the 
principle that argues that the lowest level of government capable of 
exercising authority effectively should be permitted to do so, thus 
forming something of a nested box of authority, thus allocating 
authority to the head of the house hold in a family, expanding to the 
authority of the chief in a clan or community, and working its way 
up to the authority of the king of the realm, who shares powers with 
all those ostensibly under his sovereign authority. Authority is 
allocated to each according to his  sphere of expertise (Althusius 
1932).   Of course James Madison wrote philosophically about the 
virtues of the separate states, as part of a scheme to fragment power 
(Federalist Papers 1961).  In contemporary scholarship, American 
political scientist William Riker is generally acknowledged to have 
offered the most challenging theoretical analysis of federalism 
(1964).  In his book, Federalism: Origin, Operation, and 
Significance, he asks why federal systems form and why they 
persist or fall apart.  His concern is not with American or 
Australian or Mexican or Russian federalism, but with federal 
structures generally.  His central questions:  Why do some polities, 
when they form, have unitary structures, and others federal 
structures?  What happens when the conditions that give rise to the 
creation of federalist structures later disappear?  Does the federal 
arrangement cease to exist, or do other factors emerge to sustain it?   
His answer is, in a nutshell, that federations form when smaller 
allied polities fear for national security.  That is, they agree to pool 
resources to provide for a national defence against a common 
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enemy, and once they do this they may find that there are other 
benefits—a common market, monetary union, postal service, a 
transportation system and the like.  He suggests that federalisms are 
likely to be unstable and fall apart once the common enemy 
disappears, and that they will only remain in tact if other very 
specific conditions are present.   One of the other conditions is the 
nature of political parties and elections.  If political parties are 
organized at the state level, and elections for state officials and 
party activists occur at the state level at different times than the 
national elections, he argues, there is a built-in incentive for local 
party activists and government officials to allow this arrangement 
to persist since they receive substantial benefits and power from the 
distance from national elections, the national party, and national 
candidates.  
We agree with much of what Riker says, but take a different 
approach.  Riker’s concern, like that of  more  recent theorists 
(Rodden 2006; Bednar 2009) is with institutional design - how do 
autocrats design the governmental system they want to work in?  
Our concern is for want of a better word, “anthropological.”  We 
assume that a prerequisite for nationhood is some strong degree of 
identity with the nation by inhabitants of the polity.  Our focus is 
on this condition for minimally successful nationhood.   In 
responding to this question, we follow Benedict Anderson (1991) 
and any number of other students of nationalism (e.g. Bendix 1977; 
Ignatieff 1993) who maintain that for a nation to be minimally 
successful, i.e. stable, legitimate in the eyes of its citizens, and 
enduring, it must command the respect and allegiance of its 
citizens. That is, people must identify as citizens or members of the 
nation; they must say “my” country.  So the essential question for 
Anderson is not institutional design, but a prior and much more 
elemental question, one of nationalism.   What are the prerequisites  
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for nationhood?   What are the conditions that give rise to and 
sustain national political identity?  Conceptually these questions 
may precede issues of institutional design by many steps, although 
in fact they may also arise only after a state has been established.  
In either case, they address the issues of legitimacy, stability, and 
effectiveness of governmental processes.   
If Anderson is correct, the problem with federalism is that it 
requires the near- impossible; identification with the nation and 
simultaneously identification with a constituent unit.  Like 
Anderson we take political identity seriously, and like him we 
believe that a distinctive feature of political identity is that it is 
attached to a geographical area.  With many post modernists, we 
agree that most identities are socially constructed and thus are 
contingent, changeable  and  multiple.  Most forms of identity are 
flexible enough to facilitate anomalies.   Peoples can accept the 
idea of abortion and consider themselves a good Catholic, or be 
working class and vote Conservative, or think of themselves as 
both Jewish and Christian.  
But we suggest that although political identity is also socially 
constructed, it is different from other forms of socially constructed 
identities.   By its very nature, political identity is anchored in 
geography, and requires deep commitment to a land.  In its full 
form, political identity requires a commitment to die or kill for the 
nation—a group bound together by many strands but also including 
its own distinct space.   Thus dual political identities present a 
contradiction.   
There are of course federal systems, so what accounts for them?  
They can occur for any number of reasons, but we argue that one 
feature they tend to share is incomplete political identity and the 
fragility that accompanies it.   Thus we conclude, that in most 
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instances, federalism systems are unstable (Feeley and Rubin 2008: 
7-17).  Federalism is a tragic compromise in that those identifying 
with the nation are not satisfied because national identity is 
truncated.   Those identifying with the subunits (states) are also 
frustrated. Their dream of autonomy or sovereignty—their distinct 
political identity—is unfulfilled.    The result:  nationalists will 
continue to press for more robust national unity, and those with 
loyalties to the parts will press for autonomy.  Thus instability leads 
to  the tendency for federalisms to resolve into unitary nations by 
co-optation, suppression of local sentiments, or emergence of a 
dominant national culture.  Alternatively federalism may dissolve;  
if the nation weakens and the subunits are strengthened, some or all 
of the constituent units may secede.   History is replete with both 
patterns.  
Our argument is that these changes are more common than is often 
appreciated.  Of course collapse of federal systems is more readily 
apparent, as the case of Czechoslovakia, Yugoslavia, The Soviet 
Union, United Arab Republic and the like show.  
However the shift from federal to unitary structure is not so readily 
apparent.   One reason for this is the confusion between federalism 
and decentralization. What is often said to be federalism, we 
maintain, is in fact decentralization (Feeley and Rubin 2008: 18-
30).   Indeed, many people—including almost all economists who 
write about fiscal federalism—fail to acknowledge that there is a 
difference and use the two terms interchangeably (Oates 1999).  
Here, we maintain, is where greater appreciation for theory and 
clarification of terms is useful.   It is important to appreciate the 
differences between federalism and decentralization.  The 
conventional understanding of federalism which we employ and I 
outlined above characterizes federalism as a system in which 
sovereignty or authority is divided between at least two levels of 
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government, the nation and its subunits.  Each has some area of 
sovereignty or autonomy or rights that are inviolable, irrevocable 
by the other level of government.  That is, federalism embraces a 
notion of states’ rights, and for that matter national rights, that is 
enduring.  Neither unit, however much they want to, can undermine 
the rights of the other. Both units have an ontological existence as 
it were. 
In contrast decentralization is a form of organization in which the 
more inclusive unit divides itself into useful subunits or delegates 
certain of its powers to subunits.   It is an instrumental decision, not 
an ontological reality.  The purpose here is to facilitate efficiency, 
effectiveness, or some other set of concerns.  Decentralization 
inevitably assumes the perspective of the whole, and asks, how do 
we best organize for the objectives we want to achieve—how do 
we best provide for  national defence, health care, education, how 
do we best manage the economy, develop agriculture,  and the like?  
In some instances, the answer will be centralization—national 
defence is almost always pursued in this manner.  In others, it may 
be decentralization; let local units closer to those affected, do it.  
Education is often delegated to smaller local or regional units.   But 
decentralization must not be confounded with federalism.  In 
federalism, subunits are autonomous within their spheres of 
sovereignty.  They can make or not make polices as they see fit.   
Exercising authority within this sphere of autonomy does not 
depend upon instrumental calculations set by central authority. In 
contrast, in a decentralized system subunit power is delegated, and 
if subunits fail to perform their duties, central authority can 
reassume power and try a different approach.  Thus, a nation might 
delegate to states responsibility for combating air pollution, but if 
this does not succeed it might create special regional units to 
pursue the policy or adopt a single national agency to develop a 
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national policy.  In real federalism, the nation could not usurp state 
authority in its sphere of sovereignty.  Put succinctly, 
decentralization provides a means to an end. 
Taking this distinction between federalism and decentralization 
seriously, we conclude that the United States no longer has a 
federal system.   What appears to be federalism is in fact 
decentralization.  What is celebrated as “Our Federalism” is 
nostalgia for a simpler yesteryear.  It does not describe the reality 
of the modern administrative state (Rubin and Feeley 1994).   
How do we know this?  Because there is no area of policy making 
that the US national government cannot control if there is a 
sufficient national will to do so.  Although the United States may 
once have been a federal system, historical events have transformed 
it into a unitary system.  The Civil War in the 1860s knitted 
together a national polity. Nationalization was accelerated by 
economic development in the balance of the nineteenth century.  
The Great Depression of the 1930s further expanded this 
nationalizing trend and the Civil Rights and Administrative due 
process revolutions of the 1960s and 1970s completed the process.    
This process was probably inevitable.  Indeed this was the gist of 
the argument of the Anti-Federalists (Brutus 1981), who wrote in 
opposition to the authors of the Federalist Papers (1961), and 
opposed the adoption of the Constitution.   While the Federalist 
Papers (1961), and Federalist No. 10 which discusses the division 
between state and national authority, have been translated into 
dozens of languages and widely read around the world, the lesser-
known Anti-Federalist papers, are probably more perceptive about 
the consequences of adopting the proposed Constitution.  They 
urged people to read the document carefully, and pointed to the 
expansive language in that document that granted vast powers to 
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the national government (Congress and the federal judiciary; 
everyone failed to appreciate the rise of the powerful president), 
while saying nothing about the powers of the states. History has 
proven them to be right.   
Of course the states continue to have vast powers, but their powers 
exist at the sufferance of the national government.  In one policy 
area after another, if the national government deems it in the 
national interest to create a uniform policy, it can.  Of course this 
does not preclude the national government from delegating 
responsibilities for administering these policies to the state, or 
allowing the states to initiate policies on their own so long as they 
do not conflict with national policies.  All this provides a veneer of 
federalism over what is now really a unitary state.   
We began to develop our ideas in the process of examining the 
power of the federal courts in the prison conditions litigation in the 
1960s to 1980s.  Over the course of twenty five years or so, federal 
courts assumed vast powers to order widespread changes in 
conditions in state prisons and local jails.  In their detailed orders, 
federal judges were more specific than they were in their racial 
desegregation rulings that they had begun to issue a decade earlier. 
They also differed from the racial desegregation cases in still 
another way.   The segregation cases were based on a specific 
provision in the U.S. Constitution, the provision in the Fourteenth 
Amendment that was adopted specifically to allow the national 
government and the courts to combat racial discrimination—the 
provision specifying that the states cannot deny anyone the equal 
protection of the law, and providing powers to the national 
institutions to effect this right.  There is no such nationalist 
provision for prison and jail administration.  Indeed, when it 
provided for the abolishment of slavery, the Thirteenth Amendment 
provided for one exception—it did not abolish “indentured 
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servitude” for convicted felons. Furthermore, under ancient 
common law doctrine, convicted felons were “civilly dead” and 
“slaves of the states.”  Over the years convicted felons had 
challenged such doctrine in federal courts in the United States only 
to be turned away by the “hands off doctrine,” which held that 
issues of conditions of confinement were non-justiciable issues in 
federal courts because prisons and jails fell within the sovereign 
sphere of the states, and the federal government-courts and 
Congress—had no authority to intervene and thus has to maintain a 
“hands off” posture.    In the late 1960s, this doctrine collapsed 
overnight; the national government led by federal judges but 
quickly followed by the Executive and Congress, entered the gates 
of the prison and began to order massive changes.   What changed 
was not that a constitutional amendment had been adopted, but the 
discovery of a national consensus about how prisons should be 
administered. To pursue this consensus, principles of federalism, 
Constitutional language, and longstanding doctrine were ignored; 
the courts barely paused to give them consideration, and even 
opponents of the courts’ actions rarely dwelt on them.    This 
account is significant because up until the late 1960s, prison and 
jail administration were viewed as quintessential state functions in 
the federal division of labour.   
Of course the American states still have some considerable 
authority.  Consider for example the death penalty. Sixteen states 
have abolished the death penalty and thirty four retain it.  This may 
look like federalism, and some point to it as an example of 
federalism in action.  But a moment’s reflection will lead one to 
conclude otherwise.  If there were a national consensus on the 
issue, just about everyone recognizes that Congress and/or the U.S. 
Supreme Court could put an end to the death penalty. That they do 
not is not due to federalism or to any deference to the states.  
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Rather it is due to the deep disagreement over the death penalty.  
Public opinion polls reveal that on the whole the country is divided 
on the issue.   In light of this, national politicians or politically 
astute federal judges have no desire to try to abolish capital 
punishment.   It is convenient for a great many people to side step 
the issue by saying in effect, “let the states decide.”  Still, everyone 
would acknowledge that both Congress and the federal courts have 
the means by which to abolish capital punishment given different 
political conditions.   Policy on the death penalty then reveals not 
federalism but decentralization.  What can be said about the death 
penalty, can be said about any number of other policies.   
Similarly in other countries what also appears to be federalism may 
be in fact decentralization.  The Basque and Catalan regions in 
Spain have a veneer of federalism on them, but they are better 
understood in terms of the prudential loosening of ties by the 
central government to accommodate the interests of those in these 
regions in order to reduce unrest.  However, if this policy does not 
have a payoff—if for instance it is thought to lead to greater 
violence and not less-- recentralization is a possible and probable 
outcome.   The federalist-appearing structure here is anchored in an 
instrumentalist desire to maintain stability under the circumstances, 
and not a deeply entrenched sovereignty of the regions.  What can 
be given away can be taken back.  What can be said about Spain 
applies to many other regions in the world as well.   
Of course there are some genuine federal systems.  Switzerland 
comes to mind.  Its governmental system is a product of language, 
culture, religion, valleys and mountains, and civil war.  While still 
tension- producing and ever-shifting, it does appear that an 
equilibrium of competing partial political identities has resulted in 
a stable federal system.  Certainly it is a contrast to federal systems, 
which have fallen apart (e.g. the Soviet Union, Yugoslavia, the 
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United Arab Republic, etc.) or been, swallowed up by strong 
central authority (e.g. Mexico; Russia).  Indeed in recent years one 
of the emerging topics for political theory has been divorce, the 
specifications of how unhappy parties in a federal system may 
peacefully decouple (Buchanan 1991).   
What are the implications of the argument that the United States 
and other nominally federal systems are in fact no longer federal 
systems?   No doubt there are a great many. But one of them is not 
that states should be abolished.  Every large country, even the most 
unitary of them such as France and Sweden, are divided into 
regions or districts that serve important administrative purposes.  
However practical it would be to combine North and South Dakota, 
Kansas and Nebraska, Texas and Oklahoma, Delaware and 
Pennsylvania, and the like, it makes no political sense to disturb 
traditional boundaries that have existed for one hundred years or 
more.  (By the same token it would make no political sense to try to 
unite the twin cities of St Paul and Minneapolis, Minnesota [within 
a state and not across states-thus not involving federalist 
principles], or any number of other “twin cities” throughout the 
world, even though all sorts of efficiencies might flow from such 
consolidation, and they are not products of federalism!)   
However, in the United States there is at least one federalism-
adjusting policy that does make sense.   It is this:  the issue of 
federalism should not be justiciable. That is, states and their 
supporters should not be granted standing to argue that an act by 
Congress has violated the principles of federalism.  If states are 
important entities, they have ample representation in the United 
States Congress, and particularly the Senate (in the Unites States, 
each state has two senators regardless of its population), and there 
is no need for the Supreme Court to say that states’ rights have 
been violated by a legislature which is comprised of representatives 
FJHP – Volume 28 – 2012 
13 
elected at the state and local levels.  This may sound far-fetched, 
but in fact it is a conventional argument in American Constitutional 
law, put forward by any number of scholars and judges over the 
past one hundred years.  More particularly it was advanced most 
forcefully in the mid and late Twentieth Century by Herbert 
Wechsler (1954) and Jesse Choper (1980). In fact the U.S. 
Supreme Court explicitly adopted this principle in 1985 (Garcia v. 
San Antonio Metropolitan Transit Authority), and maintained until 
an emerging conservative majority on the Court overruled it a 
decade later in United States v. Lopez (1995), and went on to 
endorse the new new-federalism that has held sway since then.  
Still, since the 1930s, the U.S. Supreme Court has never stuck 
down a major piece of national legislation on the basis of 
preserving federalism, and in those cases where it has struck down 
pieces of inconsequential legislation it has also instructed the 
Congress how it might refashion the legislation so that it would 
pass constitutional muster.  This is hardly robust federalism (Feeley 
and Rubin 2008: 124-143).  
One question that might be posed in light of the discussion above is 
this:  Is Australia a real federalism?   Nominally Australia has a 
federal system, but in fact does it? Maybe.   I do not have the 
expertise to answer the question.  But I do think that it would be 
useful to take the theory outlined above, and systematically work 
though its implications for Australia.  Admittedly our theory about 
political identify as the basis of nationalism and federalism 
suggests scepticism about a meaningful Australian federalism. But 
our theory is still in its infancy and in need elaboration.  
Furthermore, the details of Australian history and 
intergovernmental relations are too complicated for a short term 
visitor to assess.  Thus I leave it to my readers  to make the effort.    
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